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There are now many different approaches to the computational modelling of 
cognition, e.g. symbolic models (Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Newell, 1990), cognitive 
connectionist models (McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls, 1998) and neurophysiologically 
prescribed connectionist models (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000). The relative value of 
different approaches is a hotly debated topic, with each presented as an alternative to 
the others; that is, that they are in opposition to one another, e.g. (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988; Hinton, 1990). However, an alternative perspective is that these reflect different 
levels of abstraction / explanation of the same system that are complementary, rather 
than fundamentally opposed. 
 
Computer science, which has often been used as a metaphor in the cognitive 
modelling domain, gives a clear precedent for think in terms of multiple views of a 
single system. In particular, in computer science, single systems are routinely viewed 
from different perspectives and at different abstraction levels. An illustration of this is 
what is now probably the most widely used design method, the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) (Booch, Rumbaugh, & Jacobson, 1999). This approach incorporates 
multiple modelling notations, each targeted at a particular system characteristic. 
Furthermore, UML is not unique in emphasizing a multiple perspective approach; see, 
for example, viewpoints (H. Bowman & Derrick, 2001; H. Bowman, Steen, Boiten, & 
Derrick, 2002), aspect oriented programming (Kiczales et al., 1997) and refinement 
trajectories (H. Bowman & Gomez, 2006; Derrick & Boiten, 2001; Roscoe, 1998). 
 
It is not that this perspective has been completely lost on cognitive scientists; indeed, 
Marr famously elaborated a version of this position in his three levels of cognitive 
description (Marr, 2000). However, despite Marr's observations, concrete modelling 
endeavours rarely, if ever, consider multiple abstraction levels in the same context and 
particularly how to relate those levels. 
 
                                                 
1 Full reference is, "Semantic modulation of temporal attention: Distributed control and levels of 
abstraction in computational modelling." H.Bowman, Su Li, and P.J. Barnard. Technical Report 9-06, 
Computing Lab, University of Kent at Canterbury, September 2006. 
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Computer science, and particular software engineering, boasts a plethora of multiple 
perspective approaches (H. Bowman & Derrick, 2001; H. Bowman & Gomez, 2006; 
H. Bowman et al., 2002; Derrick & Boiten, 2001; Kiczales et al., 1997; Roscoe, 
1998). In some of these, the multiple perspectives offer different views of the system 
at a single level of abstraction, e.g. (H. Bowman et al., 2002). However, probably the 
longest standing and most extensively investigated question, is how to relate 
descriptions at different levels of abstraction, which, in computer science terms, 
means different stages in the system development trajectory. For example, two 
commonly considered abstraction levels are, 1) the requirements level, i.e. the abstract 
specification of "what the system must do"; and 2) the implementation level, i.e. the 
structurally detailed realisation of "how the system does it". Furthermore, there has 
been much work on how to relate the requirements level to the implementation level, 
which, in logical metaphors, amounts to demonstrating that the implementation 
satisfies the requirements or, in other words, that the implementation is a model2 of 
the requirements. In addition, this issue has been framed in terms of the notion of 
refinement, i.e. the process of taking an abstract description of a system and refining it 
into a concrete implementation (Derrick & Boiten, 2001; Roscoe, 1998). 
 
We would argue that these levels have their analogues in the cognitive modelling 
domain. In particular, we can distinguish between the following two levels of 
explanation of a cognitive phenomenon. 
 
1. high-level abstract descriptions of the mathematical characteristics of a pattern 
of data, e.g. (Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005); and 
2. low-level detailed models of the internal structure of a cognitive system, e.g. 
(Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998). 
 
These two levels of explanation really reflect different capacities to observe systems; 
that is, the extent to which the system is viewed from outside or inside, i.e., as a black 
or white box. There are clear pros and cons to these forms of modelling, which we 
discuss now. 
 
1) Black-box (Extensionalist) Modelling. With this approach, the system is viewed as 
a black-box; that is, no assumptions are made about the internal structure of the 
system and there is no decomposition at all of the black-box into its constituent 
components. Thus, the point of reference for the modeller is the externally visible 
behaviour, e.g. the stimulus-response pattern. In the computer science setting, the 
analogue of black-box modelling would be requirements specification, where 
logics are often used to express the global observable behaviour of a system 
(Manna & Pnueli, 1992). 
A critical benefit of black-box cognitive modelling, is that a minimal set of 
assumptions are made, especially in respect of the system structure. Consequently, 
there are less degrees of freedom and fewer hidden assumptions; making data 
fitting and parameter setting both well founded and, typically, feasible. For 
example, if the system can be described in closed form, key parameters can be 
determined by solving a set of equations, if not, computational search methods can 
be applied. 
 
                                                 
2 where we are using the term model in its strict logical sense (Gries & Schneider, 1994). 
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2) White-box (Intensionalist) Modelling. In contrast, with this approach, the system 
is viewed as a white box; that is, the internal (decompositional) structure of the 
system is asserted. Although we can bring theories of cognitive architecture and 
(increasingly) neural structure to bear in proposing white-box models, a spectrum 
of assumptions (necessarily) need to be made. Furthermore, typically, many of 
these assumptions concern the internal structure of the system. In the computer 
science setting, the analogue of white-box modelling would be the system 
specification, where components and interaction patterns are explicitly described 
in specification languages such as Z (Woodcock & Davies, 1996), process algebra 
(H. Bowman & Gomez, 2006; Hoare, 1985; Milner, 1989; Roscoe, 1998) or 
Statecharts (Harel, 1987). Since the information processing revolution, white-box 
modelling of cognition using a variety of computational metaphors has been 
extensively explored, e.g. (Newell, 1990; Rumelhart, McClelland, & the-PDP-
Research-Group, 1986). While structurally detailed models of cognition are likely 
to be the most revealing (especially with the current emphasis on 
neurophysiological correlates), deduction from these models is more slippery and 
potentially less well founded. Most importantly, many assumptions, such as 
settings of key parameters, need to be made, many of which may, at best, require 
complex justification and, at worst, be effectively arbitrary. As a result, parameter 
setting and data fitting is more difficult and, arguably, less well founded with 
white-box models. 
 
We can summarise then by saying that black-box modelling describes what a 
cognitive system does and it describes it in a relatively contained and well-founded 
manner. However, white-box modelling cannot be ignored, since it enables us to 
describe how a cognitive system functions, which is a concern for both traditional 
information processing and more recent neurophysiological explanations. Thus, a 
central research question is how to gain the benefit of contained well-founded 
modelling in the context of structurally detailed descriptions. 
 
A possible strategy for addressing this question is to take inspiration from the 
computer science notion of refinement. Thus, when tackling the computational 
modelling of a particular cognitive phenomenon, one should start with an abstract 
black-box analysis of the observable behaviour arising from the phenomenon. For 
example, this may amount to a characterisation of the pattern of stimulus-response 
data. However, importantly, a minimum of assumptions should be made. Then, from 
this solid foundation, one could develop increasingly refined and concrete models, in 
a progression towards white-box models. Importantly though, this approach enables 
cross abstraction level validation, showing, for example, that the white-box model is 
correctly related to the black-box model, i.e. in computer science terms, is related by 
refinement. 
 
This paper provides an initial step in the direction of multi-level cognitive modelling. 
However, although the progressive refinement methodology that we propose will be 
evident, the research is certainly no more than a first step. In particular, all our models 
sit somewhere between the black and white-box extremes; that is, pushing the 
metaphor even further, the refinement we present is more from dark-gray to light-
gray! More complete instantiations of our methodological proposal awaits further 




We will explore the issue of relating abstraction levels in the context of a particular 
class of modelling, which emphasises distributed executive control. This responds to 
traditional symbolic cognitive architectures in which control is typically centralised. 
In contrast, with distributed control, there is no central locus of the data state of the 
system and the system is composed of a set of computational entities (which we call 
subsystems) that each have a local data state and local processing capabilities. These 
subsystems evolve independently subject to interaction / communication between 
themselves. Thus, importantly, there is a distinction between the local and the global 
view of the system state; individual subsystems only having direct access to their 
local state and at no point in time does any thread of control have access to a complete 
view of the state of the system. The selection of such a distributed view of control in 
the context of cognitive modelling is justified in (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004; H.  
Bowman & Barnard, 2001). 
 
In order to obtain models that directly reflect distribution of control, we use a 
modelling technique called process algebra (H. Bowman & Gomez, 2006; Hoare, 
1985; Milner, 1989). These originated in theoretical computer science, being 
developed to specify and analyse distributed computer systems (H. Bowman & 
Gomez, 2006). A process algebra specification contains a set of top-level subsystems 
(called processes in the computing literature) that are connected by a set of 
(predefined) communication channels. Subsystems interact by exchanging messages 
along channels. Furthermore, process algebra components can be arbitrarily nested 
within one another, allowing hierarchical description in the manner advocated in (P. J. 
Barnard & Bowman, 2004; H.  Bowman & Barnard, 2001). Process algebra are an 
appropriate means to consider multi-level modelling, since they offer a rich theory of 
refinement and formal relationships between specifications (H. Bowman & Gomez, 
2006). Although, in this initial investigation in this area, we will not take much direct 
benefit from these inter level relationships. 
 
We illustrate our approach in the context of a study of temporal attention. 
Specifically, we model the temporal characteristics of how meaning captures 
attention. To do this we reproduce data on the key-distractor attentional blink task (P. 
J. Barnard, Scott, Taylor, May, & Knightley, 2004), which considers how participants' 
attention is drawn to a distractor item that is semantically related to a target category. 
Furthermore, (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) have shown that the level of salience of the 
distractor, i.e. how related it is to the target category, modulates how strongly 
attention is captured. The details of this phenomenon will be discussed in section 2.1. 
 
In the remainder of this article, we will use the term extensionalist to describe the 





2.1 The Key-distractor Attentional Blink Task 
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The models we develop make an explicit proposal for how meaning captures attention 
and particularly the temporal characteristics of such capture. The phenomenon we 
model sits within a tradition of temporal attention research centred on the attentional 
blink task. (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) were the first to use the term 
Attentional Blink (AB). The task they used to reveal this phenomenon involved letters 
being presented using Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) at around ten items a 
second. One letter (T1) was presented in a distinct colour and was the target whose 
identity was to be reported. A second target (T2) followed after a number of 
intervening items. Typically, participants had to report whether the letter “X” was 
among the items that followed T1. The key finding was that selection of T2 was 
impaired with a characteristic serial position curve; see Figure 1. T2s occurring 
immediately after T1 were accurately detected. Detection then declined across serial-
positions 2 (and also usually) 3 and then recovered to baseline around lags 5 or 6 




Figure 1: The basic “Attentional Blink” effect for letter stimuli (Raymond et al., 1992). Here, 
baseline represents a person’s ability to report the presence of T2 in the absence of a T1. 
 
As research on the blink and RSVP in general has progressed, it has become evident 
that the allocation of attention is affected by the meaning of items (Maki, Frigen, & 
Paulsen, 1997) and their personal salience (K.L. Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 
1997). There is also evidence from electrophysiological recording that the meaning of 
a target is processed even when it is not reported (K. L. Shapiro & Luck, 1999). In 
addition, there are now reports of specific effects of affective variables, e.g. (P. J. 
Barnard, Ramponi, Battye, & Mackintosh, 2005). In particular, (Anderson, 2005) has 
shown that the blink is markedly attenuated when the second target is an aversive 
word. 
 
There are now a number of theoretical explanations and indeed computational models 
of the AB; see (H. Bowman & Wyble, 2005) for a review. However, apart from the 
model discussed in (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004), all these proposals seek to 
explain "basic" blink tasks, in which items in the RSVP stream are semantically 
primitive, e.g. letters or digits. However, as will become clear shortly, our focus is 
semantically richer processing. Consequently, none of these previous theories or 
models is directly applicable to our needs in this article. However, of these previous 
theories, that introduced by (Chun & Potter, 1995) is most closely related to the model 
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we will propose shortly. Their theory assumes two stages of processing. The first 
stage performs an initial evaluation to determine “categorical” features of items. This 
stage is not capacity limited and is subject to rapid forgetting. The second stage builds 
upon and consolidates the results of the first in order to develop a representation of 
the target sufficient for subsequent report. This stage is capacity-limited, invokes 
central conceptual representations and storage, and is only initiated by detection of the 
target on the first stage. In addition, the recently proposed theory of temporal 
attention, the Simultaneous Type Serial Token model, takes key inspiration from 
Chun and Potter's 2-stage model (H. Bowman & Wyble, 2005) in explaining the AB 
phenomenon. 
 
In order to examine semantic effects in more detail, (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) used a 
variant of the AB paradigm in which no perceptual features were present to 
distinguish targets from background items. In this task, words were presented at 
fixation in RSVP format. Targets were only distinguishable from background items in 
terms of their meaning. This variant of the paradigm did not rely on dual target report. 
Rather, participants were simply asked to report a word if it refers to a job or 
profession for which people get paid, such as “waitress” and these targets were 
embedded in a list of background words that all belonged to the same category. In this 
case, they were inanimate things or phenomena encountered in natural environments; 
see Figure 2. However, streams also contained a key-distractor item, which, although 
not in the target category, was semantically related to that category. The serial-
position that the target appeared after the key-distractor was varied. We call this the 
key-distractor AB task. 
 
Participants could report the target word (accurate report), say “Yes” if they were 
confident a job word had been there but could not say exactly what it was, or say 
“No” if they did not see a target, and there were, of course, trials on which no target 
was presented. When key-distractors were household items, a different category from 
both background and target words, there was little influence on target report.  
However, key-distractors that referenced a property of a human agent, but not one for 
which they were paid, like tourist or husband, gave rise to a classic and deep blink, 





Figure 2: Task schema for the key-distractor blink; adapted from (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). 
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(P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) used Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997) to assess similarities between “human” key-distractors and job targets. 
LSA is a statistical learning method, which uses the co-occurrence of words in texts 
and principle components analysis to build a multidimensional representation of word 
meaning. In particular, an "objective measure" of the semantic distance between a pair 
of words or between a word and a pool of words can be extracted from LSA. 
 
The critical finding of Barnard et al was that the depth of the blink induced by a key-
distractor was modulated by the semantic salience of that distractor. That is, using 
LSA as a metric, the closer the key-distractor was to the target category, the deeper 
the blink; see Figure 6(b). Thus, the greater the salience of the key-distractor, the 
greater its capacity to capture attention. Reproducing this modulation of attentional 
capture by semantic salience is a central objective of this paper.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
 
Three principles underlie our models: sequential processing, 2-stages and serial 
allocation of attention. We discuss these principles in turn. 
 
2.2.1 Sequential Processing 
 
With any RSVP task, items arrive in sequence and need to be correspondingly 
processed. Thus, we require a basic method for representing this sequential arrival and 
processing of items.  At one level, we can view our approach as implementing a 
pipeline. New items enter the front of the pipeline (from the visual system), they are 
then fed through until they reach the back of the pipeline (where they enter working 
memory). Every cycle, a new item enters the pipeline and all items currently in transit 
are pushed along one place. We call this the update cycle. 
 
The key data structure that implements this pipeline metaphor is a delay-line. This is a 
simple means for representing time constrained serial order. One can think of a delay-
line as an abstraction for items passing (in turn) through a series of processing levels. 
In this sense, it could be viewed as a symbolic analogue of a sequence of layers in a 
neural network; a particularly strong analogue being with synfire chains (Abeles, 
Bergman, Margalis, & Vaadia, 1993). 
 
It is a very natural mechanism to use in order to capture the temporal properties of a 
blink experiment, which is inherently a time constrained order task. To illustrate the 
data structure, consider a delay-line of 4 elements, as shown in Figure 3, which 









Figure 3: A four item delay line. 
 
The pipeline we will employ in our model will be considerably longer than 4 units 
and we will not depict it in full here. However, it is worth representing a typical state 
of a 12 item portion of the overall delay-line during our attentional blink simulations. 
Figure 4 shows a typical state, where indices indicate the position of the constituent 
items in the corresponding RSVP item (which will here be a word). We will use this 
terminology throughout, i.e. a single RSVP item will be represented by a number of 
constituent (delay line) items, with this number determined by the speed of the delay-
line update cycle. In Figure 4, we have assumed 6 constituent items comprise one 
RSVP item (which is actually consistent with the approach we will adopt in the 
remainder of the paper and which we will justify shortly). 
 
 
ia ib ic id ja jbjc jdje jf ke kf 
1st 4 components 
of the n+1st 
RSVP word 









Like (Chun & Potter, 1995), (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) and (P. J. Barnard & 
Bowman, 2004) argued for a two-stage model, but this time recast to focus 
exclusively on semantic analysis and executive processing. In particular, (P. J. 
Barnard & Bowman, 2004) modelled the key-distractor blink task using a two-stage 
model. In the first stage, a generic level of semantic representation is monitored and 
initially used to determine if an incoming item is salient in the context of the specified 
task. If it is found to be so, then, in the second stage, the specific referential meaning 
of the word is subjected to detailed semantic scrutiny; thus, a word’s meaning is 
actively evaluated in relation to the required referential properties of the target 
category. If this reveals a match, then the target is encoded for later report. The first of 
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these stages is somewhat akin to first taking a “glance” at generic meaning, with the 
second akin to taking a closer “look” at the relationship to the meaning of the target 
category. These two stages are implemented in two distinct subsystems: the 
implicational subsystem (which supports the first stage) and the propositional 
subsystem (which supports the second) (P. J. Barnard, 1999). 
 
These two subsystems process qualitatively distinct types of meaning. One, 
implicational meaning, is holistic, abstract and schematic, and is where affect is 
represented and experienced (P. J. Barnard, 1999). The other is classically “rational”, 
being based upon propositional representation, capturing referentially specific 
semantic properties and relationships. 
 
As an illustration of implicational meaning, semantic errors make clear that 
sometimes we only have (referentially non-specific) semantic gist information 
available to us, e.g. false memories (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and the Noah 
illusion (Erickson & Mattson, 1981). In particular, with respect to the latter of these, 
when comprehending sentences, participants often miss a semantic inconsistency if it 
does not dramatically conflict with the gist of the sentence, e.g., in a Noah specific 
sentence, substitution of Moses for Noah often fails to be noticed, while substitution 
with Nixon is noticed. This is presumably because both Moses and Noah fit the 
generic (implicational) schema "male biblical figure" (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004), but 
Nixon does not. 
  
In the context of the task being considered here, these subsystems can be 
distinguished as follows. 
 
• Implicational Subsystem. This performs the broad “categorical” analysis of 
items considered in Chun and Potter’s first stage of processing, by detecting 
the presence of targets according to their broad categorical features. In the 
context of this paper, we will call the representations built at this subsystem 
implicational and we will talk in terms of implicationally salient items, i.e. 
those that “pass the implicational subsystem test". The implicational 
subsystem implements the "glance". 
• Propositional Subsystem. This builds upon the implicational representation 
generated from the glance in order to construct a full (propositional) 
identification of the item under consideration, which is sufficient for report. 
We will describe items that “pass the propositional test” as propositionally 
salient. 
 
To tie this into the previous section, the implicational and propositional subsystems 
perform their corresponding salience assessments as items pass through them in the 
pipeline. We will talk in terms of the overall delay-line and subsystem delay-lines. 
The former of which describes the complete end-to-end pipeline, from the visual to 
the working memory and response subsystems, while the latter is used to describe the 
portion of the overall pipeline passing through a component subsystem, e.g. the 
propositional delay-line. 
 
2.2.3 Serial Allocation of Attention 
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Our third principle is a mechanism of attentional engagement. It is only when 
attention is engaged at a subsystem that it can assess the salience of items passing 
through it. Furthermore, attention can only be engaged at one subsystem at a time. 
Consequently, semantic processes cannot glance at an incoming item, while looking 
at and scrutinising another. This constraint will play an important role in generating a 
blink in our models. 
 
When attention is engaged at a subsystem, we say that it is buffered (P. J. Barnard, 
1999). Thus, salience assignment can only be performed if the subsystem is buffered 
and only one subsystem can be buffered at a time. The buffer mechanism ensures that 
the central attentional resources are allocated serially, while data representations pass 
concurrently, in the sense that all data representations throughout the overall delay-
line are moved on one place on each time step. 
 
2.2.4 Why New Models? 
 
A computational model of the Attentional Blink (AB) was presented in (P. J. Barnard 
& Bowman, 2004), which produced the basic key-distractor blink curve. We present a 
sequence of models to extend the previous one, in order to address recent 
experimental findings and theoretical accounts (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). In 
particular, the previous model simply generated a blink curve, however, a central 
concern of the current investigation is to consider how the depth of the blink curve 
(and hence the extent of attentional capture) is modulated by the salience of the key-
distractor. The first model is an extensionalist model, which minimises the 
assumptions made about the structure of the system. In contrast, the second model is 
intensionalist in character, which makes more detailed assumptions about the internal 
structure of the system. 
3 Extensionalist AB Model 
 
3.1 Data Representations 
 
This model works at a high level of theoretical abstraction, e.g. words are expressed 
by their roles in Barnard et al’s blink task: background, target and distractor (P. J. 
Barnard et al., 2004). This only distinguishes between different word types, i.e. 
background (Back), target (Targ) and key-distractor (Dist): 
 
Word_tp ::= Back | Targ | Dist 
 
where distractor has two types: high salient (HS) and low salient (LS): 
 
Dist ::= HS | LS 
 
The data representations in the model are defined as follows: 
 
Rep ::= ( Word_tp, Sal, Sal ) 
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which associates salience assessments with words in the RSVP stream. The first 
element in the representation is the word type identity. The second and the third 
elements are an implicational and a propositional salience assessment respectively. 




Similar to the previous model (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004), the current model is 
also composed of two ICS subsystems, along with source and sink components. As 
shown in Figure 5, the two ICS subsystems include the implicational subsystem (Imp) 
and propositional subsystem (Prop). The source and the sink summarise the 
perceptual subsystems and the maintenance and response subsystems respectively. 
The source outputs a data representation to Imp every 20ms of simulated time. 
Barnard et al’s experiment consists of 35 words presented at a rate of 110ms per word 
(P. J. Barnard et al., 2004).  Hence, a word in the model contents six data 
representations, which approximates the 110ms presentation. The data representations 
are then passed through the two subsystems. Finally, the data representations reach 




Control channel: prop_imp 










Figure 5 Top-level structure 
 
3.3 Delay Lines 
 
Within each subsystem, there is a single delay line. The delay lines in both 
subsystems increment by one slot every 20ms. Then the first item of the implicational 
delay line becomes the most recent data representation input from the source. The last 
item of the implicational delay line is removed and passed to Prop via the data 
channel between the two subsystems. The propositional delay line has the same 
behaviour as the implicational delay line. Consequently, data representations arrive at 
the sink every 20ms. Both delay lines can hold 10 data representations. This reflects 
both the memory and the amount of time spent on a subsystem's information 
transformation.  
 
3.4 Salience Assignment 
 
Each subsystem assigns salience to the data representation entering it. The salience 
assignment is performed at the delay line of the subsystem in buffered mode. We will 
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define the mode of a subsystem in the relevant section. As we have explained 
previously, a word is composed of several data representations, e.g. six in the current 
simulation, the semantic meaning of a word is built up gradually through time. Hence, 
a subsystem can access the meaning of a word by looking across several data 
representations that belong to the same word. In most cases, one does not have to 
process all the data representations in order to assemble the meaning. That is, the 
meaning of a word usually emerges from the first few representations. In the current 
model, we assume that the meaning of the word can be obtained after processing the 
first three data representations. In addition, each subsystem assigns salience to data 
representations according to predefined probabilities, which will be explained in the 
relevant sections. 
 
3.5 Buffer Movement 
 
The subsystem that is buffered decides when the buffer moves and where it moves to. 
Initially, Imp is buffered. It passes the buffer to Prop when it detects an 
implicationally salient word. A word is seen to be implicationally salient if it has at 
least three implicationally salient data representations. Then Prop takes a detailed look 
at the word in order to make sure that it belongs to the target category. Prop can only 
do so if it is buffered. However, the buffer moves with a delay. It is set to 200ms, 
which reflects the average time required to relocate the attentional resources. The 
mean delay was 210ms in the previous model (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004). It 
will become clear that the delay of buffer movement plays an essential role in 
generating the blink. 
 
When Prop is buffered and detects an implicationally uninterpreted word, the buffer is 
passed back to Imp. This is because propositional meaning builds upon coherent 
detection of implicational meaning. Thus, when faced with an implicationally 
uninterpreted item, Prop is no longer able to assign salience and the buffer has to 
return to Imp to assess implicational meaning. Prop needs to look across three data 
representations in order to know that the implicational meaning is un-interpreted. 
 
In real life situations, stimuli do not arrive as rapidly as in AB experiments, so Imp 
and Prop will normally interpret the representation of the same word or event for an 
extended period. However, in laboratory situations, such as RSVP, items may fail to 
be implicationally processed as the buffer moves between subsystems. The delayed 
buffer movement dynamic provides the underlying mechanism for the blink, i.e. 
 
• When the buffer moves from Imp to Prop, because the distractor was found 
implicationally salient, salience assessment cannot be performed on a set of 
words (i.e. a portion of the RSVP stream) entering Imp following the 
distractor. Hence, when these implicationally uninterrupted words are passed 
to Prop, propositional meaning cannot be accessed. If a target word is within 
these words, it will not be detected as implicationally salient and thus will not 
be reported. 
• There is normally lag-1 sparing in AB experiments, i.e. a target word 
immediately following the distractor is likely to be reported. This arises in our 
model because buffer movement takes time, hence, the word immediately 
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following the distractor may be implicationally interpreted before the buffer 
moves to Prop.  
• When the buffer moves back to Imp, it assigns salience to its data 
representations again. After this, target words entering the system will be 
detected as implicationally and propositionally salient and thus will be 
reported. Hence, the blink recoveries. 
 
 
3.6 Parameter Setting 
 
We investigate the key parameters used in the simulation in this section. The first set 
of parameters is the refresh rate of the system. There are two time scales in the model. 
The first one is how fast the data representations are passed between subsystems, and 
the second one is how fast each of the subsystems updates its state. We assumes that 
all subsystems input/output a data representation every 20ms. As a result, all delay 
lines also increment by one slot every 20ms. This assumption is justified by the 
observation that underlying neural mechanisms can represent updates around every 
20ms (Bond, 1999; Rolls & Stringer, 2001). In addition, since a word is presented for 
110ms (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) , a word is comprised of 6 data representations. The 
refresh rate of the state in subsystems is every 5ms. This assumption is not 
constrained by neural biological facts, but by implementation requirements. For 
example, it has to be less than the refresh rate of data representation. This fine grain of 
time course allows us to be more discriminating with regard to the temporal properties 
of the attentional blink. However, a high refresh rate will have implementation costs, 
in terms of how long simulations take to run. 
 
The second set of parameters is the delay of buffer movement. In the current model, 
the buffer can move in two directions, i.e. from Imp to Prop and vice versa. So, there 
are two buffer movement parameters, i.e. D  denotes the delay of buffer movement 
from Imp to Prop and D  denotes the delay of buffer movement back in the other 
direction. In our model, lag-1 sparing sets the lower bound of . In order to report 
targets that immediately follow distractors, the buffer should actually move no sooner 
than 120ms after the time when Imp determines that the buffer needs to move. (This is 
the time when the first three data representations of the lag-1 item have been 
processed at Imp, given that each item/word contains 6 data representations, data 
representations are passed every 20ms and Imp can make a decision about salience 
once it has seen three data representations.) Furthermore, the onset of the blink sets 
the upper bound of . In order to miss lag-2 targets, the buffer should move no later 
than 220ms after the time when Imp determines that the buffer needs to move. (This is 
the time when the first two data representations of the lag-2 item have entered Imp.) It 
can be seen that lag-1 sparing and the sharp onset of the blink set the range of values 
 can be selected from. The recovery of the blink is a function of both delay 
parameters and the length of the delay line. (The length of the delay line is set by . 
This will be discussed later.) However, from the slow recovery of the human blink 
data, we can see that D  is less constrained. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that the buffer moves in both direction at the same speed. This assumption reflects the 









sections, it can be seen how this simple assumption fails and how we solve it.) In 









However, this is not enough to know where to set D  and  within the 120ms to 
220ms range. A relevant issue here is the extent to which lag-1 and lag-2 items are 
processed. Although we will not explain exactly how our model realises the sort of 
partial awareness that arises at these lags until the relevant sections, the human data 
(P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) already suggests that targets at lag-2 are processed to the 
extend that subjects are aware of the presence of the target words. This suggests that 
the first part of the lag-2 item is implicationally processed before the buffer moves 
away. Hence, D  is likely to be closer to 220ms than 120ms. As a result, we assume 
that  and  are 200ms, which is approximately the length of one and a half words. 
Note, in this extensionalist model, we do not add noise to parameters, however, the 






The third set of parameters is the length of the delay lines, which is set by D . We 
denote the length of the implicational delay lines by L , which is measured by the 
number of data representations it holds. It also determines how long it takes for a data 
representation to travel through it. Given that a data representation reflects 20ms of 
information and each subsystem looks across three data representations on the delay 
line, the following inequation ensures that the buffer moves to Prop in time to catch 1) 




msLLD w 20)3( 11 ×−+<  
 
where  denotes the length of a word, which is measured by the number of data 
representations it is composed of. In the current model, 
wL
6=wL . So, the right hand side 
of the inequation becomes ( msL 20)31 ×+ . This is the time from when Imp 
determines that the buffer needs to move, to when the last three data representations 
of a lag-1 target have entered Prop. Rearranging the above inequation, we obtain the 
following. 
 
32011 −÷> msDL , so 
71 >L , given msD 2001 = . 
 
The recovery of the blink sets the upper bound of L . Given that performance 
recovers by around lag-5 and the buffer moves back to Imp when the lag-2 item enters 
Prop.  is generally constrained by the following inequations, which ensure that the 




msLD 20)64( 12 ×−×< , so,  
141 <L , given msD 2002 = . 
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In summary, . Hence, we assume that the length of the delay line is 10 data 
representations. The length of the propositional delay line L  is less constrained in 
this model. By symmetry again, we assume that 
147 1 << L
2
1021 == LL . 
 
3.7 Raw Results 
 
An epoch denotes 9 simulation trials. Each trial within an epoch has the same 
parameter setting, except for the serial position of targets relative to distractors. On 
one hand, the model will produce a blink if it detects an implicationally salient 
distractor. The simulation result of one epoch is shown in Figure 6(a) if an 
implicationally salient distractor is detected. On the other hand, the simulation result 
is a flat line of 100% correct report if the distractor is missed. However, humans 
perceive information in a noisy environment, i.e. salient items may be missed by 
humans. In the current model, we assume that Prop is perfect in distinguishing targets 
and non-targets and the likelihood of detecting an implicationally salient item 
determines the depth of the blink curve. The simulation results show that the widths 
of all blink curves are the same. This is because the width of the blink is a function of 
the length of the delay line, the duration of the word presentation, and the total delay 
of the implicational and propositional buffer movements. These parameters are 
constants in this model.  
  
There are different likelihoods of detecting implicationally salient items. The first one 
is the probability of judging targets to be implicationally salient , which is 
set by the baseline performance of human subjects. Barnard et al, have reported that 
humans correctly report the target’s identity on average on 67% of trials with no 
distractor. At high lags the blink curve also recovers to this baseline performance (P. 
J. Barnard et al., 2004). The second one is the probability of detecting a background 
word as implicationally salient , which is assumed to be 0. The third one is 
the probability of detecting a distractor as implicationally salient P , which 
becomes  in the high salient condition or P  in the low salient 
condition. According to our model, the deepest point in the blink curve reflects the 










(Pimp( DistPimp ¬ 3 We can then obtain the probabilities ¬  for both 
high and P )rgTa( LSimp ∧¬  for low salience conditions based on the blink curves in 
Figure 6(b). In summary, we have obtained the following: 
 
67.0)( =rgTaPimp  
0)( =BackPimp  
34.0)( =∧¬ rgTaHSPimp  
54.0)( =∧¬ rgTaLSPimp  
 
Detecting targets and distractors are two independent events. So, 
                                                 
3 Note, this is the only way that a target can be detected at the deepest point of the blink. That is, if a 




















Given 67.0)( =rgTaPimp , we can obtain the following: 
 
34.067.0))(1( =×− HSPimp  and 54.067.0))(1( =×− LSPimp , hence, 
49.067.034.01)( =÷−=HSPimp  and 19.067.054.01)( =÷−=LSPimp . 
 
This calculation determines how the model behaves and how epochs are combined to 
generate a blink curve. The results of the simulation contain three types of epochs:  
 
• A flat line at 100%, which corresponds to the model missing the distractor and 






















• A flat line at 0%, which corresponds to missing the target. The percentage of 













• A blink curve as shown in Figure 6(a), which corresponds to detecting both 



















These three situations cover all the possible results in the simulation, accordingly their 







∧+¬+∧¬= ++ rgTaDistPrgTaPrgTaDistP blinkpercpercperc impimpimp  
 
In the high salience condition: 
 
%34)()()1( =∧¬=∧¬= rgTaHSPrgTaDistPperc impimp , 
%33%67%100)()0( =−=¬= rgTaPperc imp , 
and %33%33%34%100)()( =−−=∧= rgTaDistPblinkperc imp  
 
In the low salience condition: 
 
%54)()()1( =∧¬=∧¬= rgTaLSPrgTaDistPperc impimp , 
%33%67%100)()0( =−=¬= rgTaPperc imp , 
and %13%33%54%100)()( =−−=∧= rgTaDistPblinkperc imp  
 
Then, according to these proportions, we average across these different outcomes 
across all epochs for all conditions. We obtain the curves shown in Figure 6(c,d) for 



































































































Human - HS Human - LS
34.0)( =∧¬ rgTaHSPimp
54.0)( =∧¬ rgTaLSPimp  
 
Figure 6 T2 accuracy by lag from extensionalist model and humans. (a) Simulation results from a 
single epoch. (b) T2 accuracy by lag in humans for high salience and low salience key distractors. 




3.8 Adding Noise  
 
In the previous model (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004), noise was added to the delay 
of the buffer movement in order to reflect individual differences and variance in 
performance within individuals. Different amounts of noise were added at different 
stages of processing, i.e. the delay of buffer movement from Imp to Prop is less noisy 
than the buffer movement in the opposite direction. This produces a sharp blink onset 
and a shallow blink recovery. Our extensionalist modelling abstracts from this level of 
explanation. In the current model, the simulation results are averaged across multiple 
epochs and then convolved with a noise function. As a reflection of the high level of 
abstraction of this model, randomness is imposed globally and externally. This 
technique does not require specification of either the source or the dynamics of noise 
inside the model. As a result, assumptions about the internal structure of the system 
are minimised and also the number of simulation runs is reduced.  
  
O’Reilly and Munakata use a similar approach to adding noise in their PDP++ 
simulation (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000). They derive a noisy rate coded activation 
function by convolving a Gaussian-distributed noise (GDN) function with a noise free 
output function. The resulting function approximates the average effect of a 
population of neurons, whose spike timing is subject to random variation (Shadlen & 
Newsome, 1994). The convolution in our model has the following form: 
 
∫ −=⊗= τττ dtfggftF )()()( , 
 
where  denotes a noise function and g  denotes the averaged raw simulation 
results. Note that this function also extends the raw results into the pre-lag-1 and post-
lag-9 areas. We assume that the percentage of correct report of the target in these 
areas is the baseline performance 67%. The reason for this is that, in the pre-lag-1 
area, the targets come before the distractors. In the post-lag-9 area, there is a large 
time gap between the targets and the distractors. Hence, in both cases, the processing 
of the targets will not be affected by the processing of the distractors. 
)(tf )(t
 
Inspired by O’Reilly and Munakata’s approach, we also use a GDN function. The 
idea is that the performance of lag-N is more similar to its adjacent lags, e.g. lag-(N-1) 
or lag-(N+1), than more distant lags. Figure 7(a) compares the simulation results of 
the convolution using a GDN function with var 0.4=  (var denotes the standard 
deviation) and the experimental results of human subjects (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). 
As is shown in Figure 7(a), a convolution with a single GDN function with var  
gives reduced lag-1 performance, and almost the same steepness of blink onset as 
recovery. It does not fit the behavioural data (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). Although we 
only show the effect of one GDN function, other GDN functions (with different 
settings of standard deviation) do not work better than this. One reason for this is that 
we have made inaccurate assumptions about D
0.4=
21 D=  in the previous section. As we 
have explained previously, the buffer movement delay sets the steepness of the blink 
and the assumption of D  ensures that the onset and recovery of the blink have 




The solution requires us to adjust D . However, the nature of extensionalist 
modelling prevents us from making more assumptions about the variation of D  
inside the model. Hence, one way to improve the simulation results is to gradually 
increase the deviation of the GDN function by serial position, i.e. the GDN function is 
narrower at the earlier lags and broader at the later lags. After a simple search through 
the parameter space, we chose the nine GDN functions shown in Figure 7(b). At lag-
1, the standard deviation of the GDN is 0.14 and it increases by 0.15 at each lag. We 
call this approach a convolution with sliding noise. This approach is not only 
consistent with the idea used in the previous model (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004), 
but also preserve the extensionalist modelling approach. In the relevant section, we 
will introduce an intensionalist approach to this issue. The intuition behind this 
approach is that there is less noise in the earlier stage processing than in the later stage 
processing, which influence the blink onset and recover respectively. The 
extensionalist approach to noise used here also has the benefit of being very general; 
in particular, with respect to the randomness of buffer movement delay used in (P. J. 
Barnard & Bowman, 2004). As is shown in Figure 7(c), the convolution can smooth 
the original simulation results. The dotted lines are the results of convolutions using 
nine GDN functions individually. The solid line applies the convolution with sliding 
noise, i.e. different GDN functions at different serial positions. This results in a sharp 
blink onset and a shallow blink recovery. In the next section, we will investigate how 




The convolution technique reduces the performance at lag-1 and high lags below 
100%. This is because every data point in the result is affected by all other data points 
in the blink curve. We should also note that the performance at lag-1 is better than 
high lags (post recovery). This is because the convolution with sliding noise ensures 

























































Figure 7 (a) Convolution using a single GDN ( var 0.4= ) vs. Human data in the high salient 
condition. (b) Nine GDN functions. (c) Convolution with sliding noise in the high salient 
condition. 
 
3.9 Awareness, Partial Processing and Three Types of Responses  
 
Barnard et al, use three types of responses: report of the target identity, “no job seen” 
and “yes, I saw a job, but could not report its identity” (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). 
This reflects different degrees of awareness of the target presence. In our simulations, 
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the meaning of a target word can also be processed to three different degrees. We 
argue that different degrees of processing result in different types of response.  
 
Implicational salience Propositional salience Responses 
Fully interpreted (salient) Fully interpreted (salient) Correct report of identity 
Fully un-interpreted Fully un-interpreted “No” responses 
Partially interpreted Partially interpreted “Yes” responses 
Table 1 Different degrees of processing of meaning and their corresponding responses (targets) 
 
As is shown in Table 1, both implicationally and propositionally fully interpreted 
words can be reported correctly with their identity. In the current model, being fully 
interpreted means that at least three data representations have been processed. This 
situation is shown as the solid line in Figure 8, these words can occur at positions 1, 6, 
7, 8 and 9. In the second situation, some target words can be implicationally fully un-
interpreted because Imp is not buffered. In this model, Prop is only able to access the 
propositional meaning for implicationally interpreted representations. Hence, these 
words will also be propositionally fully un-interpreted. This demonstrates the 
situation where subjects are completely unaware of the presence of target words, i.e. 
the “no” responses. These words can occur at positions 3 and 4, as shown as the 
dashed line in Figure 8. Finally, some target words can be partially processed. This 
means less than three of the data representations of the target word have been both 
implicationally and propositionally processed; shown as the dotted line in Figure 8. 
Target words at position 2 and 5 are partially interpreted. This arises since distractors 
can trigger the buffer to move. It moves with a delay of 200ms, which means it moves 
at the time point when the first data representation of the second word following the 
distractor has just been processed. Then Prop partially assigns propositional meaning 
only according to one interpreted data representation. Similarly, only the last data 
representation of the fifth word following the distractor is processed. This simulates 
that subjects are aware of the presence of the target word due to partially interpreted 
meaning; however, its identity cannot be reported due to lack of information. Hence, 
they will use the “yes” response. Note, other types of partially interpreted words do 
not occur in the model since buffer movement dynamics ensure that an 
implicationally interpreted data representation will always be propositionally 

























Figure 8 Proportion of three types of response from Simulation (single epoch in the blink 
condition) 
 
We adjust the simulation results shown in Figure 8 according to the probabilities of 
detecting different types of words, and apply the sliding noise convolution technique. 
It was reported by Barnard et al, that correct report of no job seen averaged 85% when 
no target occurred in the stream. Hence, 15% of the responces are “yes” responses, 
since they could not report the identities of targets. This is also reflected at the high 
lags, where “yes” responses return to around 10%. We combine epochs for “yes” and 
“no” responses in the following way. 
 
• For “yes” responses: 15% of epochs are flat lines at 100%, 49% 
( 49.0)( =HSPimp ) in high salient condition and 19% ( ) in low 
salient condition of epochs are the dotted curve shown in Figure 8, the rest of 
the epochs are flat lines at 0%. 
19.0)( =LSPimp
 
• For “no” responses: 18% of epochs are flat lines at 100%, since the sum of the 
baseline performance of correct report of identities, the baseline performance 
of “yes” responses and the baseline performance of “no” responses is 1 
(100 ), 49% (%18%15%67% =−− 49.0)( =HSPimp ) in high salient condition 
and 19% ( ) in low salient condition of epochs are the dashed 
curve shown in Figure 8, the rest of the epochs are flat lines at 0%. 
19.0)( =LSPimp
 
The resulting percentages of correct report of target identities, “no” responses and 
“yes” responses are shown in Figure 9. These graphs also illustrate the difference in 
performance between the high and the low salience conditions. The results are 
consistent with the experimental results (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004) shown in the same 
graph. Note, the model does not completely fit the behavioural data at positions 4 and 
5, but, broadly speaking, it makes an excellent qualitative, and indeed quantitative fit 
to the human data. In particular, the capacity of the model to reproduce modulations 
in blink curve depth by distractor salience is the key effect that our model has been 



























































































Figure 9 (a) Human performance in high salient condition, (b) simulation results in high salient 
condition, (c) human performance in low salient condition, (d) simulation results in low salient 
condition.  
 
4 Intensionalist AB Models  
 
As explained previously, the extentionalist model works at a high level of theoretical 
abstraction. In contrast, the intensionalist model works at a lower level of abstraction. 
We will present two approaches to decomposing the extensionalist model: 1) 
modelling the meaning of individual words and assigning salience according to that 
meaning; 2) modelling noise inside the model rather than through the extensionalist 
convolution approach. Finally, we combine these two approaches and present our full 
intensionalist model. 
 
4.1 Approach 1: Modelling Meaning 
 
4.1.1 Data Representations 
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Words are individually modelled, with word meanings represented using Latent 
Semantic Analysis or LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), which will be explained in 
relevant sections. However, the set of words can be defined as follows: 
 
Word ::= {word1, word2, word3, …...} 
 
An example of an RSVP stream is (island, ticket, tourist, television, waitress, ……), 
where each item in the stream is of type Word, i.e. equal to wordi for some i. A set of 
measurements can be associated with each individual word. Each measurement is a 
function, which returns a real value.  These are obtained from LSA and describe the 
semantic distance between a word and a set of words, i.e. LSA cosines. In our model, 
we measure the distance between individual words and a pool of words that all belong 
to a certain category, i.e. 
 
measure(Word,Pool1) : real 
measure(Word,Pool2) : real 
…... 
 
The data representation in the current model is almost the same as the previous model, 
i.e. 
 
Rep ::= (Word, Sal, Sal) 
 
4.1.2 Architecture and Delay Lines 
The structure of this model and the delay lines are the same as the previous model. 
 
4.1.3 Salience Assignment 
 
In the previous section, we have explained that a data representation is set to be both 
implicationally and propositionally undefined when it initially enters Imp. In our 
extensionalist model, each subsystem assigns salience to data representations 
according to predefined probabilities. In this intensionalist model, we hypothesize that 
a word is assigned to be salient if the semantic distance (LSA cosine) between the 
word and the target category is smaller than a specified threshold. The implicational 
threshold is bigger than the propositional threshold as shown in Figure 10. This 
realises the theory that Imp takes a “glance” at the generic meaning and Prop takes a 
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Figure 10 Salience assignments. Semantics in LSA are expressed in a high dimensional space. 
This illustration is restricted to 2D for ease of depiction. 
 
In Figure 10, there are two spaces, i.e. the implicational salience space and the 
propositional salience space. The propositional salience space is a subset of the 
implicational salience space. As a result, these two spaces define four types of word, 
i.e. type P, type I, type J and type U. 
 
• The area defined by the propositional threshold is called the propositional 
salience space. 
• The area defined by the implicational threshold is called the implicational 
salience space. 
• Words in the propositional salience space are type P words. 
• Words in the implicational salience space are type I words. 
• Words not in the implicational salience space are type U words, which are 
both implicationally and propositionally unsalient. 
• Words in the implicational salience space, but not in the propositional salience 
space, are type J words, which are implicationally salient but propositionally 
unsalient. 
 
The target word (i.e. job word) category is within the propositional salience space. 
Hence, they are both implicationally and propositionally salient. On the other hand, 
background word categories are disjoint from the implicational salience space. Hence, 
they are both implicationally and propositionally unsalient. Distractors can be of two 
types: type J and type U. It will be clear later that only target job words can be 
reported and only type J distractors may produce a blink. Note, this graph is an 
idealised illustration of the semantic space. It describes only one possible 
configuration of these word categories, by which the cognitive system may produce 
the desired AB phenomenon. However, it is not true to think that humans actually 
perceive words in these ways. Indeed, the human system would be much more 
complicated and noisy than this idealised conceptualisation. In the relevant sections, 
we will discuss how to approximate this idealised perspective using more realistic and 
constrained materials. 
 
4.1.4 Buffer Movement, Parameter Setting  
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The buffer movement and parameter setting in this model are the same as the previous 
model.  
 
4.1.5 Raw Results 
 
In the current model, the semantic similarity expressed in the distance between the 
distractor and the target word’s category determines the depth of the blink curve. The 
result of one epoch can also be one of the following three types according to whether 
the distractor and the target are implicationally salient. 
 
• A blink curve as shown in Figure 11(a), which corresponds to epochs that 
have type J distractors and type P targets; 
• A flat line at 100% (no blink) as shown in Figure 11(b), which corresponds to 
epochs that have type U distractors and type P targets; 
• A flat line at 0% as shown in Figure 11(c), which corresponds to epochs in 
which the target is implicationally unsalient, i.e. type U targets. This does not 
occur in the idealised setting, however, it may occur in the real LSA. These 
epochs determine the baseline performance. 
 
Note, we do not show type J targets here, since they are related to partial responses, 
which will be explained in the relevant sections. As we have discussed in previous 
sections, the widths of all blink curves are the same. A distractor category contains 
both J and U type words. Hence, simulation results of words in the distractor category 
can be either step functions or flat lines. We need to average the single epoch result of 
all distractors. This results in an intermediate level of the bottom of the curve. The 
level depends on the proportion of type J words in the distractor category, i.e. the 
more type J words, the lower the level, hence the deeper the blink. As shown in 
Figure 10, the high salient distractors category has more type J words than the low 
salient distractors category, so the blink curve shown in Figure 11(d) will be deeper 
than the curve shown in Figure 11(e). Note, Figure 11 only qualitatively illustrates 
that the semantic space affects the depth of the blink curves. However, in the next 
section, we will investigate the quantitative relationship between the semantic space 
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Figure 11 Simulation results from single epochs: (a) Epochs with type J distractors and type P 
targets. (b) Epochs with type U distractors and type P targets. (c) Epochs with type U targets. (d) 
Average – high salient condition. (e) Average – low salient condition. 
 
4.1.6 Adding Noise 
 
We also use the convolution technique to add noise in this model. 
 
4.1.7 LSA Calculations and Semantic Space  
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We have hypothesized the idealised semantic space (Figure 10) and a model based on 
this space in the previous sections. However, we have not yet explained how this 
space is derived from real LSA calculations. In this section, we will explore suitable 
constructions of the semantic space with respect to the comparison of simulation 
results with human performance. The comparison will also serve as a validation of the 
ICS account of the AB phenomenon and our model. As we have explained in the 
previous sections, implicational meaning is vital in determining the depth of the blink. 
It is also responsible for the difference in blink depth between HS and LS conditions. 
Hence, we concentrate on implicational meaning in this section and assume that Prop 









































































































Figure 12 Distribution of HS and LS distractors in the semantic space based on the LSA cosines 
between distractors and the task instructions. X-axis denotes LSA-cosines, and y-axis denotes 
frequency, i.e. number of words with that LSA value. 
 
In (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004), one of the LSA analyses of the distractor words 
calculates the cosine between each distractor and the task instructions. As an initial 
step, we use this calculation to form our semantic space. In our model, the depth of 
the blink curve depends on the percentage of distractors above and below the 
implicational threshold. Figure 12 is a histogram that shows how HS and LS 
distractors are distributed in this semantic space. We can place the implicational 
threshold at 0.15. As a result, 52.5% of HS distractors are type J words and 44.4% of 
LS distractors are type J words. Moreover, 60.9% of targets are type P words (also 
type J words by default) and 39.1% of targets are type U words. In theory, the model 
would produce blink curves as shown in Figure 13 after applying the convolution. It 
can be seen that this does not match the human performance. Furthermore, a simple 
search of these distributions demonstrates that placing the implicational threshold at 































Figure 13 Percentage of correct report of target identity across serial positions after distractor 
 
The reason why the model does not reproduce the human data is because the two 
distributions are too similar. In particular, broadly speaking, the commonest cosines 
are the same in both distributions. Thus, no single threshold can be found by which a 
large proportion of the HS distribution is above it, but a much smaller proportion of 
the LS distribution is above it. This is reflected in the distributions of the LSA cosines 
of HS and LS distractors in relation to task instruction not being statistically different, 
i.e. T-test value between the two distributions in Figure 13is 0.597. This suggests that 
the relation to task instructions is not a suitable measurement for interpreting 
implicational meaning in this model. 
 
In response to the failure of this simple approach, we explore more sophisticated 
analysis of the semantic meaning derived from LSA. In this analysis, we calculated 
the LSA cosine in relation to different generic word categories (see Appendix A), 
which are likely to contribute to implicational meaning (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). 
Generic words (pools) denote a set of words that describe the generic meaning of a 
word category. As shown in Table 2, only human relatedness and household 
relatedness are statistically significantly different between the HS and LS distractors. 
Hence, we chose the most informative calculation, i.e. the human relatedness, to 
construct a semantic space and see whether the model can reproduce the human data. 
 
 HS Average LS Average HS v LS T-test 
Human 0.166 0.103 < 0.001 
Occupation 0.092 0.073 0.24 
Payment 0.029 0.016 0.1 
Household 0.081 0.139 0.01 
Nature fillers* 0.079 0.077 0.88 
Target Jobs* 0.157 0.146 0.6 
Table 2 Cosines to Generic Pools. * These two pools are not generic pools, but are related to the 
AB task. 
 
We plotted the same histogram as Figure 13 using human relatedness. (Not shown in 
this paper.) The implicational threshold can also be placed at 0.15. This time it will 
give enough separation between the HS and LS conditions (21/40 vs. 6/36), and the 
model, in theory, will produce a similar difference in performance as humans. Figure 
14 shows how many words are implicationally salient for HS, LS, nature and target 
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words. However, there is a problem here, since about 15% of the nature words are 
implicational salient, but only 32% of target words are implicational salient. We 
would expect the vast majority, if not all, target words to be implicationally salient. 
Hence, the model will not produce the human data. In addition, similar problems arise 
with other settings of the implicational threshold. This means that human relatedness 






















Figure 14 Number of type U (implicationally unsalient) and J  (implicationally salient) words in 
HS, LS, nature and target words category 
 
The failure of this analysis again suggests that a more sophisticated approach is 
required. It suggests that, in the context of this experiment, implicational meaning is a 
multidimensional evaluation. In order to further investigate this issue, we integrate the 
LSA calculations in relation to generic human, generic occupation, generic payment, 
generic household, and nature pool. We did not include the target pool and the reason 
will become clear later. The result is computed as a weighted sum of these five 
different values.  
 
n
wwwm nn ⋅++⋅+⋅= coscoscos 2211 L , 
 
where n is 5, each cos value is an LSA distance to a pool of words, and each w is a 
weight with respect to its pool. These weights indicate how informative each 
dimension is as a predictor of implicational meaning. We can regard the m calculation 
as a new LSA measurement that characterises implicational meaning. Effectively, we 
are "skewing" the LSA space according to the extraction of implicational meaning. 
The five weights characterise this skewing, reflecting the relative emphasis that the 
implicational schema puts on each of the five dimensions. 
 
Note that the above equation is actually the activation of a linear neuron with n inputs 
(O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000). Hence, we construct a neural network to determine 
these weights.  
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Figure 15 A neural network that computes the m value. 
 
The network shown in Figure 15 has two layers. The input layer contains five 
neurons, one for each of the five word pools. Activations of the neurons are LSA 
cosines. The output layer is a single neuron with activation the m value. We train the 
network using all the words we use in the AB experiment. The learning algorithm 
used is the delta rule (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000). The inputs are LSA cosines and 
the expected output is 1 for targets and 0 for non-targets. The learning finishes when 
the weight settles, i.e. their changes are smaller than a given value (e=0.0001). Note, 
this stop criterion does not guarantee accurate identification of the targets. However, 
this is consistent with the fact that Imp cannot identify targets accurately. Using the 
trained network, we can calculate the m values for all words. We will then derive the 
























Figure 16 Number of type U  (implicationally unsalient) and J  (implicationally salient) words in 
HS, LS, nature and target word categories 
 
Figure 16 shows that this new calculation solves the issue in Figure 14. 52.5% of  
high salient distractors and 22.2% of low salient distractors are implicationally salient. 
Nature words are mainly implicationally unsalient, except for one word, “pinnacle”. 
(We exclude this word from our simulation.) 63.4% of target words are 
implicationally salient, except for “bookie, captain, chauffeur, colonel, dentist, 
dustman, headmaster, housemaid, lumberjack, optician, potter, constable, florist, and 
shepherd”. Some of these words, e.g. dustman, headmaster, housemaid, lumberjack, 
potter and publican, are rarely used in American vocabulary4. Other words, e.g. 
bookie, captain, colonel, constable and courier, are not often used as jobs or 
professions in American. So, their relation to jobs and professions is lower than would 
be the case in the UK. Hence, the American LSA calculations may not reliably reflect 
our experimental results in the UK. We assume that 82.9% of targets are 
implicationally salient after reconsidering the difference between American and 
                                                 
4 This is determined by whether they have an entry in the Cambridge Dictionary of American English. 
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British English. Note, the result is different from our idealised model in Figure 10. 
However, taking into account human perception, this new calculation gives a nice 
approximation of the extentionalist model.  
 
4.1.8 Partial Awareness and Three Types of Responses 
 
We have explained how Imp assigns salience according to LSA. In order to fully 
explore partial processing of the targets, we also investigate the salience assignment at 
Prop. Imp considers one level of meaning, which encodes an abstract schematic 
model. Prop considers another level of meaning, which encodes a description of the 
referential and specific relationships in semantic space. As we have discussed 
previously, Imp plays a key role in reproducing modulations in blink curve depth by 
distractor salience. Hence, Prop was regarded to be prefect in distinguishing targets. 
However, in this section, Prop also makes mistakes in detecting targets. 7% of the 
time, Prop assigns unsalient to a salient data representation. As we have discussed 
previously, 82.9% of the targets are implicationally salient. 17.1% of targets are both 
implicationally and propositionally unsalient (type U targets). 66.7% of targets are 
both implicationally and propositionally salient (type P targets), i.e. at least three data 
representations are correctly assigned by Prop (82 ).  0.001% 
of targets are implicationally but propositionally fully unsalient, i.e. none of the data 
representations are correctly assigned by Prop ( ). About 
16.2% (100 ) of targets are partially processed by Prop, 
i.e. only one or two data representations are correctly assigned by Prop. These 





• Baseline of correct report of target identities is 66.7%, 
• Baseline of “yes” responses is 16.2%, 
• Baseline of “no” responses is 17.1%. 
 
The raw simulation results are averaged according to the LSA evaluation in Figure 16, 
baseline performance calculated previously, and convolved with sliding noise. Figure 
17 compares human data on the left and simulation results on the right. The top two 
are the results of the HS condition and the bottom two are the results of the LS 
condition. It can be seen from Figure 17 that the model produces very similar results 
































































































Model - Correct ID. Model - "no" Model - "yes"
 
Figure 17 (a) Human performance in high salient condition, (b) simulation results in high salient 
condition, (c) human performance in low salient condition, (d) simulation results in low salient 
condition. 
 
4.2 Approach 2: Modelling Noise  
 
4.2.1 Data Representaions 
 
The data representations in this model are the same as the extensionalist model, i.e. 
words are modelled by their types. 
 
4.2.2 Architecture and Delay Lines 
 
The structure of this model and the delay lines are the same as the previous models. 
 
4.2.3 Salience Assignment 
 
The salience assignment in this model is the same as the extentionalist model, i.e. 
using probabilities derived from the external observations of human data. 
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4.2.4 Buffer Movement, Parameter Setting and Noise Levels 
 
The key parameters used in this intentionalist model approach are the same as the 
extentionalist model, except that we reconstruct the model by introducing noise to the 
delay of the buffer movement within the simulation. As a reflection of the fact that 
this is a more concrete model than the previous one, convolutions are not used here. 
Similar to (P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004), different amounts of noise are added into 
the buffer delay at different stages, i.e. less noise is added to the delay of buffer 
movement from Imp to Prop than the delay of buffer movement in the opposite 
direction. This is also justified by the extensionalist model, i.e. the sliding noise 
ensures that the noise level increases by lag. As we have discussed previously, the 
buffer movement delay is not assigned arbitrarily. Instead, the time course of the blink 
constrains the range and the distribution of buffer delay. Hence, we have performed a 
simple search on the distribution of the buffer moving from Imp to Prop in order to fit 
with the human data (P. J. Barnard et al., 2004). As a result, we found that one of the 
simplest distributions is setting it to either 180 or 220ms with equal probability. 
However, the buffer movement in the other direction is less constrained by the time 
course, so we have to perform a wider range of search in the parameter space for a 
suitable distribution. The result is that it may be sampled from the following ten 
possibilities: 20, 100, 180, 260, 340, 420, 500, 580, 660 and 740ms according to a 
normal distribution. A probability mass of 0.0228 is associated with 20 and 740; 
0.0441 with 100 and 660; 0.0918 with 180 and 580; 0.1499 with 260 and 500; and 




Figure 18 compares human data on the left and simulation results on the right. The top 
two are the results of the HS condition and the bottom two are the results of the LS 
condition. It can be seen from Figure 18 that the model produces very similar results 


























































































Figure 18 (a) Human performance in high salient condition, (b) simulation results in high salient 
condition, (c) human performance in low salient condition, (d) simulation results in low salient 
condition. 
 
4.3 Full Intensionalist Model 
 
In this section, we combine the two approaches 1) modelling meaning using LSA 2) 
introducing noise inside the model simulations. We have also obtained very similar 


























































































Figure 19 (a) Human performance in high salient condition, (b) simulation results in high salient 
condition, (c) human performance in low salient condition, (d) simulation results in low salient 
condition. 
 
5 Comparing the Extensionalist and the 
Intensionalist Models 
 
 Extensionalist Model Modelling Meaning Modelling Noise Intentionalist Model 
Data 
Representation 
By word types: 
Word_tp ::= Back | 
Targ | Dist 
By word identities: 
Word ::= {word1, 
word2, word3, …...} 
By word types: 
Word_tp ::= Back | 
Targ | Dist 
By word identities: 
Word ::= {word1, 
word2, word3, …...} 
Structure 2 subsystems 2 subsystems 2 subsystems 2 subsystems 
Delay Lines 10 items 10 items 10 items 10 items 
Salience 
Assignment 
According to the 
probabilities derived 
from human data: 
67.0)( =rgTaPimp  
0)( =BackPimp  
49.0)( =HSPimp  
19.0)( =LSPimp  
Proportion of type I, 
J, P and U words 
derived from the 
LSA calculations: 
%9.82)( =rgTaI
%7.66)( =rgTaP  
%5.2)( =BackJ  
%5.52)( =HSJ  
%2.22)( =LSJ  
According to the 
probabilities derived 
from human data: 
67.0)( =rgTaPimp  
0)( =BackPimp  
49.0)( =HSPimp  
19.0)( =LSPimp  
Proportion of type I, 
J, P and U words 
derived from the 
LSA calculations: 
%9.82)( =rgTaI  
%7.66)( =rgTaP
%5.2)( =BackJ  
%5.52)( =HSJ  
%2.22)( =LSJ  




sampled from a 
narrow distribution 
around 200ms.  
2D  is randomly 
sampled from a broad 
distribution from 
20ms to 740ms. 
sampled from a 
narrow distribution 
around 200ms. 
2D  is randomly 
sampled from a broad 
distribution from 




Partial processing at 
fixed serial position 
Partial processing at 
fixed serial position 
Partial processing at 
different serial 
positions according 
to buffer delay 
distribution. 
Partial processing at 
different serial 
positions according 




According to the 
probabilities derived 
from human data: 
15% of the responses 
are “yes” responses, 
18% of the responses 
are “no” responses. 
Proportion of type I, 
J, P and U target 
words derived from 
the LSA calculations 
and partial process: 
%7.66)( =rgTaP  
%1.17)( =rgTaU  
16.2% of targets are 
partially processed. 
According to the 
probabilities derived 
from human data: 
15% of the responses 
are “yes” responses, 
18% of the responses 
are “no” responses. 
Proportion of type I, 
J, P and U target 
words derived from 
the LSA calculations 
and partial process: 
%7.66)( =rgTaP  
%1.17)( =rgTaU  




















imp ∧=  
Note: in all epochs, 
blink onset and 
recovery are at the 
same lag, due to the 



















Note: in all epochs, 
blink onset and 
recovery are at the 
same lag, due to the 















imp ∧=  
Note: in each epoch, 
blink onset and 
recovery are at 





















Note: in each epoch, 
blink onset and 
recovery are at 







































































































































































Add noise in  and 
 as shown above 
1D
2D
Add noise in  and 





Similar to the human 
behaviour and 
capturing the effect 
of blink depth. 
Similar to the human 
behaviour and 
capturing the effect 
of blink depth. Also, 
similar to the results 
of the extensionalist 
model. 
Similar to the human 
behaviour and 
capturing the effect 
of blink depth. Also, 
similar to the results 
of the extensionalist 
model. 
Similar to the human 
behaviour and 
capturing the effect 
of blink depth. Also, 
similar to the results 
of all other models. 
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Table 3 Comparison between models at different levels of abstraction 
 
The key findings from this comparison are: 
 
• The two mechanisms for modulating depth of the blink achieve similar effects, 
i.e. from probabilities observed externally from the human data and from 
underling semantic meaning derived from LSA. 
• The two methods of introducing noise have similar effects on the blink curves, 
i.e. via convolving with sliding noise and adding different levels of noise to 




6.1 Attentional Capture by Meaning 
 
We have provided a concrete account of attentional capture by meaning and the 
temporal dynamics of that process. Key principles that underlie this account are the 
division of the processing of meaning into two stages, which are supported by the 
implicational and propositional subsystems. Each subsystem assesses a different type 
of meaning: implicational and propositional, respectively. In the context of Barnard et 
al's key-distractor blink task, attention is captured when a key-distractor is interpreted 
as implicationally salient. This then causes attention (i.e. the buffer) to be redeployed 
to the propositional subsystem, in order to enable a more detailed (propositional) 
assessment of the salience of the key-distractor. Critically, this redeployment of 
attention leaves a temporal window in which implicational salience is not assessed, 
leaving the system vulnerable to missing even highly salient items. It is through this 
mechanism that the model blinks. 
 
A number of key findings have arisen from our modelling. Firstly, we have provided 
further evidence for the applicability of Latent Semantic Analysis in the context of 
attentional capture by meaning. That is, we have shown that a model that measures 
semantic distance using LSA can reproduce the key-distractor blink and semantic 
modulations of blink depth. Furthermore, we have shown that these LSA calculations 
are consistent with a more extensionalist approach in which probabilities of ascribing 
implicational and propositional salience are derived directly from the blink curve; see 
section 3.7. This is an illustration of how a multilevel modelling approach can provide 
converging evidence for a theoretical position. The identification of a schema for 
implicational salience assessment (see section 4.1.7) is an important further 
contribution. 
 
Secondly, we have clarified the characteristics of attentional redeployment when 
meaning captures attention. In particular, at an extensionalist level, the need to use a 
convolution with sliding noise (see section 3.8) suggests that temporal noise increases 
systematically by serial position. At a more intensionalist level, this sliding noise is 
realised as variance in the buffer movement delay. That is, there is little variance in 
the delay in buffer movement from implic to prop, while there is a good deal of 
variance in the delay in buffer movement from prop back to implic. One possible 
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explanation of this finding would be that there is greater variance in propositional 
than implicational salience assessment.5 Thus, the indication is that there is less 
variance in extracting semantic gist (at Implic) than extracting referential meaning (at 
Prop). This is not surprising, since, unlike Prop, Implic does not have to fully analysis 
and generate a concrete referent, which is likely to be affected by many variables. 
Thus, it seems likely that Implic has a more fixed timecourse than Prop. 
 
From a more general perspective, we present a spectrum of computational models of 
attentional capture by meaning, each of which provides an excellent fit to blink data. 
Furthermore, our multi model and level approach provides a high degree of 
converging evidence for our theoretical proposals. 
 
6.2 Cognitive Architectures 
 
The model presented here can be placed within the context of a broad cognitive 
theory: the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) architecture (P. Barnard, 1985; 
P.J. Barnard, 1999). Distributed control is inherent in ICS: subsystems are 
independent components, which interact through exchange of data representations 
over communication channels (P. J. Barnard, 1999; P. J. Barnard & Bowman, 2004; 
H.  Bowman & Barnard, 2001; H. Bowman & Faconti, 1999). ICS asserts that 
cognition emerges as the product of the interaction between a set of autonomous 
subsystems. Both the delay-line and buffering concepts that we use have their roots in 
ICS. However, most significantly, the implicational - propositional distinction reflects 
ICS' dual-subsystem central engine (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). 
 
6.3 Multi-level Cognitive Modelling 
 
We have provided a case study for how multilevel modelling can be applied in the 
cognition setting. However, to really reap the benefit of such modelling, new 
simulation paradigms and methods need to be investigated, such as the following. 
 
1) In computer science there are a number of mathematically characterised 
refinement relations and transformations (H. Bowman & Gomez, 2006; Derrick & 
Boiten, 2001; Roscoe, 1998), along with supporting decision procedures to check 
such relations (Roscoe, 1998). An important research agenda is to investigate how 
these notions of refinement carry over to the cognitive modelling setting. In 
particular, can systematic refinement based cognitive modelling trajectories be 
developed? A central question that needs to be addressed is how refinement 
carries over to a setting in which data distributions (e.g. reaction times) need to be 
simulated; typically in computer science, requirements are completely 
deterministic. 
 
2) A thorny question that refinement prompts is how to relate symbolic and 
subsymbolic (neural) models. One might argue that the archetypal abstraction 
level distinction in cognitive modelling is that between the symbolic and the 
                                                 
5 Note, the model is set-up such that each subsystem has a fixed basic salience assessment delay, which 
effectively sets a minimal speed of assessment. Variance in salience assessment is added on top of this 
basic delay through variance in the corresponding buffer movement delay. 
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subymbolic, with the former being inherently abstract and the latter tied directly to 
"neural implementation". Thus, to span the full spectrum of abstraction levels, a 
means to relate symbolic and subsymbolic would really need to be identified. This 
relationship is, of course, also central to key questions in cognitive neuroscience, 
such as how language is coded in the brain (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Despite a 
number of decades of work, the symbolic-subsymbolic question has still not been 
conclusively answered. However, important strides have been made, e.g. (d'Avila 
Garcez, Broda, & Gabbay, 2002). In addition, (Su, Bowman, & Wyble, 2005, 
2006) have made a preliminary contribution on how to encode neural networks in 
communicating automata (which are related to the process algebra used here) and 
also explore how formal verification methods, particularly model-checking (H. 
Bowman & Gomez, 2006), can be used in this context. This suggests a possible 
junction between the type of modelling notations employed in this paper and 
neural networks. 
 
3) A less ambitious, although fully justified, approach would be to develop 
refinement-like relationships within a single modelling class. For example, within 
the neural networks domain, is it possible to relate the kind of abstract (rate-
coded) connectionist models employed in cognitive psychology, e.g. Stroop 
models (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), to the neurophysiologically more 
detailed models used in neuroscience, e.g. (Dehaene et al., 1998)? 
 
It is unrealistic though at present to believe that we can support all "refinement steps" 
with formally defined relationships. Despite this, it may still be beneficial to think in 
terms of refinement trajectories, even though they are not at present formally 
supported. That is, the discipline provided by multilevel modelling may be valuable 
even if it is reliant upon informal consistency and refinement relationships. Viewing 
systems from different perspectives and levels of abstraction is just a useful 
exploratory method for understanding systems, and it is one that the cognitive 
modelling domain should not miss. 
7 Appendix A 
 
List of targets:   
accountant, apprentice, architect, baker, bodyguard, bookie, builder, butcher, captain, 
chauffeur, colonel, constable, courier, dentist, doctor, dustman, editor, engineer, 
florist, headmaster, housemaid, janitor, jockey, librarian, locksmith, lumberjack, 
mechanic, mercenary, merchant, optician, parson, playwright, potter, printer, 
publican, salesman, secretary, shepherd, surgeon, therapist, waitress. 
 
List of high salient distractors: 
Accomplice, admirer, adversary, auntie, cousin, coward, disciple, egghead, enthusiast, 
extrovert, grandson, heathen, heckler*, heretic, hooligan, hunchback, husband, 
informant, kinsman, loudmouth*, neighbour, opponent, patron, pedestrian, pragmatist, 
raconteur, refugee, saviour, scoundrel, shopper, spectator, stranger, sweetheart, 
thinker, tourist, vegetarian, visionary, visitor, volunteer, voter, widow, witness. 
 
List of low salient distractors: 
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barometer, brolly*, button, cabinet, cellophane, chandelier, cosmetic, cupboard, 
curtain, deodorant, detergent, dictionary, elastoplast*, flagon*, footrest*, freezer, 
hammer, handle, ladder, ladle, lantern, notepaper, oven, percolator, picture, 
piggybank*, pillow, porcelain, potstand*, projector, radiator, settee, souvenir, spatula, 
spotlight, staircase, tablecloth, tankard, television, toothpaste, trolley, wireless. 
 
List of nature word distractors: 
arctic, vegetation, river, precipice, atmosphere, ocean, blizzard, valley, seabed, 
permafrost, thicket, volcano, pebble, hurricane, cavern, sandbank, quicksand, 
escarpment, canyon, terrain, crater, spinney, amethyst, pasture, thunder, horizon, 
rainforest, undergrowth, glacier, prairie, equator, meteor, daylight, boulder, mountain, 
tundra, continent, wilderness, lava, pinnacle. 
 
List of background word fillers: 
archipelago, backwoods, beach, biosphere, brook, channel, cliff, cloud, cloudburst, 
coastline, crevasse, crevice, cyclone, desert, diamond, drought, sediment, earthquake, 
eruption, estuary, everglades, fissure, fjord, floodplain, frost, geyser, gorge, grassland, 
habitat, hailstone, headwind, hillside, hoarfrost, iceberg, icecap, inlet, island, 
landscape, lightning, limestone, meadow, monsoon, moonlight, moraine, mudflats, 
outback, outcrop, pampas, plains, plateau, puddle, quartz, rainbow, raindrop, rapids, 
reef, riverbank, riverbed, saltmarsh, sandstorm, savannah, seashore, shoreline, 
skyline, snowflake, straits, stream, sunshine, swamp, tempest, tornado, breeze, 
tributary, causeway, waterfall, wetlands, whirlpool, woodland. 
 
Note, LSA calculations were obtained from a database at University of Colorado 
Boulder http://lsa.colorado.edu/. * denotes words that do not have LSA entries in the 
database. 
 
List of generic human words: 
human, people, mankind, womankind, someone, mortal, fellow, sentient, folk, soul. 
 
List of generic payment words: 
payment, fee, remuneration, recompense, bribe, salary, honorarium, income, earnings, 
wages. 
 
List of generic household words: 
ornament, device, utensil, gadget, tool, possession, decoration, fitting, fixture, 
furnishing. 
 
List of generic occupation words: 
occupation, profession, job, trade, employment, work, business, career, livelihood, 
vocation. 
 
8 Appendix B 
 
Instead of using nine different GDN functions, we are interested to explore whether a 
single noise function could also be used to produce the blink curve. Several different 
noise functions have been considered. One of them is shown in Figure 20(a). This 
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function is based on the typical waveform of crosstalk noise generated by resistor and 
capacitor (RC) circuits, which is a circuit with a voltage source (battery) connected in 
series with a resistor and a capacitor (Heydari & Pedram, 2005; Takahashi, 
Hashimoto, & Onodera, 2001). It is widely believed that neural circuits can be 
modelled using RC circuits (Koch, 1999). Hence, neural networks introduce the same 
type of noise as generic RC circuits. This approach is also consistent with the 
mechanism used in the previous model, i.e. the underlying mechanism of salience 
assessment is less noisy in the earlier stages than later. As is shown in Figure 20(b), 
the convolution can smooth the original simulation results. The shape of the noise 
function also produces a sharp blink onset and shallow blink recovery. However, this 
approach does not solve the reduced lag-1 performance problem. 
 
              (a)                                       (b)                      
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